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Abstract
Despite significant growth of the domestic airline industry, Indonesia was hesitant 
to ratify the ASEAN Open Skies Policy (OSP) until 2016. One of the recent findings 
exposed the increasing concern over foreign–domestic airline competition with 
too little attention in exploring airline aspirations and the potential interplay 
between the airline preferences and the state interest. This study empirically 
investigates the dynamics of domestic resistance to the implementation of OSP, 
and to what extent the interplay of Indonesian airlines’ business preferences, 
ASEAN contexts and state interests have contributed to the OSP ratification 
postponement. Taking some lessons from the OSP ratification, we argue that 
the efforts towards advancing ASEAN economic integration through the open 
skies are contested domestically when business preferences showed mixed 
reactions. There has been little agreement on how the OSP could benefit the 
domestic airlines following their own business strategy. In the meantime, state 
principles indicated certain priorities for domestic interests, while ASEAN 
contexts allowed a member state to practice a negotiated move. The study was 
conducted using a qualitative method, with semi-structured interviews involving 
three Indonesian airlines (state and privately owned, full service and budget 
airlines), government officials, a civil society element and the Indonesian national 
air carriers association.
1International Political Economy, University of Groningen, The Netherlands.
2Multilevel Governance and Regional Structure, University of Groningen, The Netherlands.
Corresponding author: 
Prayoga Permana, International Political Economy, University of Groningen, 9712 CP, The 
Netherlands.
E-mail: m.p.permana@rug.nl
Journal of Asian Economic Integration
2(1) 44–61, 2020






Permana et al.  45
Keywords
ASEAN open skies, business preferences, competition, state interest, economic 
integration
JEL Classification: F0, F5
Introduction
This study investigates the dynamics of domestic resistance to the implementation 
of the ASEAN Open Skies Policy (OSP) in Indonesia, and to what extent the 
economic preferences of Indonesian business has contributed to the OSP 
postponement. We argue that the efforts towards advancing ASEAN economic 
integration are contested domestically when domestic interest has a greater stake 
than a policy commitment to the regional economic integration. This argument 
was derived partially from Hameiri and Jones (2014) in Murdoch School of 
political economy. The theory has asserted that domestic power relations have a 
crucial factor in determining interstate relations in Southeast Asia. Given this 
perspective, domestic politics becomes a primary factor which determines the 
success and failure of integrating ASEAN economies.
Indonesia, the largest ASEAN economy, has a well-established domestic 
market and carriers for air transport. Despite the economic growth that was lower 
than expected in 2017 and 2018, Indonesian carriers have recorded an outstanding 
growth with a double-digit increase in 2017 and potentially see a higher growth in 
2018 (The Straits Times, 2017). Lion Air, Indonesian largest low-cost carrier, has 
ordered the most aircraft in numbers, making it the second largest carrier in Asia 
after AirAsia (Morris, 2017).
Contrary to expectations, the optimistic market outlook could be an impediment 
for implementing an open sky policy in the region (Forsyth, King, & Rodolfo, 
2006). Recent evidence suggests that Indonesia (and Lao PDR, not included in 
this study) was the last ASEAN open skies signatory to ratify the ASEAN Single 
Aviation Market (ASAM) protocols (Govindasamy, 2016). Previous studies have 
shown that despite the massive growth of the domestic airlines in Indonesia, there 
was an increasing concern over regional competition at home. A study conducted 
by Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) in 2014 has 
illustrated that Indonesia’s hesitation to liberalise its domestic aviation markets 
was due to the local airline providers demand to protect their markets. Domestic 
carriers might face tough competition that potentially threatens their established 
market share. In the meantime, the government tends to incline towards 
protectionism as the government concerned about the domestic airlines losing out 
to foreign competitors (Forsyth et al., 2006).
A number of studies have focussed on measuring the economic impact of the 
OSP but left the domestic interplay of resistance empirically unanswered. For 
instance, the study of Hanaoka, Takebayashi, Ishikura, and Saraswati (2014) 
highlights the relevancies of joint ventures between the low-cost carriers (LCCs) 
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and the full service carrier (FSC) as a strategy to tackle the potential impact of 
LCC expansion before and after the implementation of the OSP. To our knowledge, 
there was continuously growing interest to study the political economy of the OSP 
in a multilateral perspective. The study of Woll (2012) on EU–US Open Skies has 
shown that the EU and the UK reluctance to sign the EU–US was to provide a 
room for competing actors to respond.
Specifically, in ASEAN and Indonesia, the study of Saraswati and Hanaoka 
(2013) suggests that Indonesia’s reluctance to fully implement the OSP was due 
to mutual benefit issue that Indonesia might gain from the policy. Indonesia 
would rather step into the OSP gradually, to provide a period of adjustment, 
particularly for the airlines to adapt, as well as for the infrastructures to keep up. 
Besides, Azalia (2017) argued that ASEAN regional characteristics have affected 
domestic approach on decision making and the postponement of the OSP 
implementation itself.
From these studies, the domestic power relations and the counter forces remain 
a puzzle. Too little attention has been paid to the business aspirations and the 
potential interplay between business and government that constraint Indonesia’s 
move to fully implement the OSP. This study frames business as a pressure group 
which tends to support or oppose the OSP. In addition, there is no research that has 
been found empirically covered Indonesian domestic airlines perspectives on the 
implementation of OSP. Political-economic perspective on the impact of the state-
business coalition to the national commitment over an economic initiative in 
ASEAN region also remains unexplored. One major theoretical issue that has 
dominated the field of political economy of integration in Southeast Asia is that 
the study is state-centric, focussing on state behaviour rather than business as a 
prominent domestic actor that constraint the economic integration.
This article is structured by first delivering a literature section that covers 
theoretical foundations of the study and how the theories have constructed a 
framework to focus the analysis. This study also reviews the Indonesian context 
of ASEAN OSP. The section provides an understanding of Indonesia’s approach 
towards the policy. The OSP in ASEAN and particularly in Indonesia works in 
different settings than the OSP elsewhere such as in the European Union.
Research Questions
Learning from the OSP implementation case in Indonesia this study proposes 
two research questions to discuss within a theoretical framework. One of the 
most important issues to discuss within the perspective of political economy is 
the preference aggregation from basic interest at the domestic level dynamics 
to political and economic interest in the regional sphere, and the role of the 
state to find consensus in dealing with various interests. We framed the 
perspectives in the following questions: How did business preferences constrain 
a commitment towards economic integration? and how did the state respond to 
the business preferences?
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Research Focus and Methodology
This article focusses on the politics of traffic rights agreement for the scheduled 
airlines serving passengers for the international routes that have been approved 
under the ASEAN OSP schemes (the fourth and the fifth freedom traffic rights), 
with three Indonesian airlines as a case study. The study was conducted in the 
form of a qualitative method, empirically based on semi-structured interviews 
with the key informants. We were also invited to attend a focus group discussion 
in Yogyakarta concerning bilateral and multilateral agreements on the traffic 
rights that was conducted by the Transport Ministry.
Our interviews involved the bureaucrats from the Ministry of Transportation, 
Republic of Indonesia; a senior manager of Garuda Indonesia (GA); a commercial 
director of Indonesia AirAsia (QZ); a director of Sriwijaya Air (SJ) and NAM Air 
(IN); a civil society element: secretary general of Indonesian Air Law Society, and 
a permanent committee for Air Transport, Indonesian Chamber of Commerce 
(KADIN); a senior officer of Indonesia National Air Carriers Association (INACA); 
and a vice president of PT Angkasa Pura II (Indonesia’s airport company).
Due to practical constraints, this study did not engage with the Lion Air Group, 
the largest domestic market segment in Indonesia. The main reason for selecting 
GA, SJ and QZ is that the airlines representing three major business segments in 
Indonesian aviation industry so that this study would be able to capture a wide 
variety of perspectives regarding the OSP. GA represents a state-owned, a national 
carrier and a full-service airline with both international and domestic routes. QZ 
has long been recognised as a low-cost airline, an associate carrier of AirAsia (a 
foreign carrier from Malaysia) with a focus on international routes. SJ and IN are 
privately owned airlines, serving domestic routes with international routes in Asia 
as new potential markets.
Literature Review
Preference Formation: A Domestic Level Approach
Taking collectively from the works of Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009), 
Schimmelfennig (2015) and Jones (2016), this study would highlight the 
importance of exposing micro-level conflict of interests in domestic preference 
formation. The struggle over channelling economic preferences through economic 
integration is not simply an aggregation of interest by the state as the sole actor, 
whereby the economic actors could play a critical role in shaping the preference.
At the theoretical level, preferences on regional economic integration are 
formed by a translation process of state interest as well as business interest which 
stems from the domestic level. In a review of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI ), 
Schimmelfennig (2015) suggests that European integration was shaped by 
national preference rather than geopolitical interest. The integration was 
constructed from the aggregation of domestic preference formation by looking at 
the possibility of maximising national welfare. Therefore, political actors would 
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advocate the integration as long as they are convinced that integration could 
maximise the benefits. LI illustrates that a move towards integration at regional 
level is a result from common perceptions of economic interdependent among the 
actors. As from Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009), the most fundamental 
element that constructs integration is commercial interest with the assumptions 
that states play a role that conducts policy coordination and bargaining. The 
member states channel economic preference of producers in alliance with the 
ruling government’s rational choices.
Similarly, Jones (2016) has argued that regional integration can only be 
possible with a dialogue between economic interests and ruling coalition rather 
than regional normative approaches. Jones (2016) thus explains in political 
economic point of view, ‘regionalism is contested, its outcome fundamentally 
shaped by socio-political conflict’ (Carroll & Sovacool, 2010 and Jones, 2016 
cited in Jones, 2016). Taking some lessons from sectoral integration in ASEAN, 
Jones (2016) further describes that regional integration is shaped by micro-level 
conflicts in certain sectors. Thus, the future of integration is depending on 
struggles over structural adjustments in each sector that are being negotiated with 
the dominant economic interests and the politicians.
Policy Preference Formation: From Interests to Preferences
Interest constitutes values that business actors are assumed to pursue as a goal. 
Preference is defined as a translation process from the businesses’ basic interests 
to their political stances or strategy (Woll, 2005). The translation process is 
affected by their identity, causal and normative beliefs and strategic environment. 
The translation process is depicted in Figure 1. 
The translation path from Figure 1 begins with the basic interest. For businesses, 
this can be the survival of their companies as a goal. To achieve the goal, the 
business actor has to ensure profitability as a subjective interest. The business 
actor could further contextualise their interests through means of preference, such 
as aiming to seek economic protection from the government. In a more concrete 
policy, the actors might demand tariffs or quota as a strategy.
Figure 1. Translation Process From Interest to Policy Choice (Preference)
Source: Adapted from Woll (2005).
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It is important to note that a traditional approach of aggregating business in a 
single frame of commercial interest might be problematic because the interest of 
business might be changing over time, depending on business and political 
environment at the time the policy was launched vis-a-vis the period of 
implementation. To frame the business preference, Verdier (1993) posits the 
Industrial Calculus, ‘producers have fundamentally mixed preferences, seeking 
competition on what they consume but a rent on what they produce. For instance, 
import sensitive producers can either benefit from lower tariffs on their inputs or 
from higher tariffs from their outputs’. Chase (2003), on the other hand, has 
proposed two conditions on whether the businesses as domestic groups would 
likely to support or against regional trade liberalisation. First, when it enables 
the producers to reach economies of scale and second, when it allows them to 
operate across borders. Furthermore, Woll (2005) argued that businesses 
sometimes have to make decisions based on incomplete information and 
uncalculated moves.
Public Choice and Commitment to Regional Economic Integration
A conventional perspective often assumes that the government aims at ‘the public 
interest’. Vaubel (1986) opposed the assumption by asserting that international 
commitments could further constrain national leaders and bureaucrats’ freedom of 
discretion. As a result, the actors seek an agreement which potentially satisfies 
them personally, helps them to gain votes and reduces the cost of losing support 
by implementing their own favoured domestic policies. In other words, the 
political actors might deny any potential of unpopular domestic policies that were 
introduced by international agreements.
Mattli (1999) proposed two types of conditions for regional integration to 
succeed. First, there are significant potential economic gains that drive a 
market player to demand for regulations, rules or regional policies. Second, 
the supply conditions must be fulfilled. The conditions are when political 
leaders have a willingness to accommodate the integration process step by 
step. Their willingness builds upon the payoff of integration for their political 
motivation such as retaining power through the betterment of domestic 
economic condition. However, domestic political willingness is not a sole 
factor, regional coordination matters to ensure fair economic distribution 
among the member states in the region. A state would likely to commit for an 
integration to serve as a focal point of regional policies, as well as to ease the 
tensions that may arise.
Analytical Framework
Krasner (1983, cited in Laursen (2010)) has identified several variables that 
construct institutional choice towards integration which consists of independent, 
intervening and dependent variable (Figure 2). We adapted Krasner’s research 
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design to explain the supply of commitment to economic integration, in this 
case, is OSP ratification postponement, by constructing new sub-variables from 
the theoretical reviews.
Business preferences at the domestic level are treated as the main supply of 
integration outcomes. The preferences of policy choices emerge from their basic 
interests, identities and strategic environment. Business preferences later 
translated to the outcome by a dialogue with two important intervening variables: 
elite level preferences and regional institution context. The first intervening 
variable depicts the interest of elites, their perceived economic benefit from the 
open skies and the possibility of pursuing more bargaining in regional negotiations. 
Both interests, business and elites are intermediated in a frame of ASEAN regional 
institutions that include their norms and architecture.
Discussion
The discussion is structured into two parts. The first part mainly deals with assessing 
the intervening variable, the ASEAN context of OSP and the Indonesian attitude 
towards the open skies. The second part explains business preferences, and the potential 
interplay between the business preferences and elite preferences in empirical narratives. 





















Figure 2. Analytical Framework Adapted from Krasner (1983)
Source: Laursen (2010).
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The ASEAN Context of Open Skies Policy
With an initial aim to advance regional economic integration in terms of service 
and regional connectivity, the ASEAN OSP was meant to take into effect on 1 
January 2015. Without any doubt, air transport is a critical area of cooperation for 
regional trade in ASEAN because this sector contributes to the reduction of 
transaction cost (Tham, 2008). The policy is also commonly known as ASAM.1 
The multilateral ASAM agreement endorses ASEAN Member States to adopt the 
unlimited third, fourth and fifth freedom of airlines operations in the region (Jin 
Tan, 2014). The third freedom allows designated airlines owned by state A to fly 
passengers and cargo to state B within the region. For Instance, GA has a right to 
fly from Jakarta to Bangkok, Surabaya to Singapore or Bali to Manila (see Table 
1). The fourth freedom allows the airlines to return from the same route, that is, GA 
has a right to fly from Bangkok to Jakarta, Singapore to Surabaya and Manila to 
Bali. The fifth freedom permits an airline to serve a route from a point to another 
point within the ASEAN member states with an additional stopover either for 
profit or discharge, that is, GA serves a route from Jakarta to Bangkok with a 
stopover in Singapore (Jin Tan, 2014).
The nature of ASEAN OSP is different from the other region such as Europe 
in several ways which making it more difficult to integrate. In terms of law 
enforcement, ASEAN OSP is a negotiated move by member states rather than 
being enforced by a supranational body. In the European Union, the OSP is 
placed under the European Court of Justice (Forsyth et al., 2006). In other 
words, the progress of open skies is determined by the member states rather 
than ASEAN Secretariat (Lee, 2015). In terms of practice, ASAM does not 
endorse the OSP any further than fifth freedom for the scheduled passenger 
services. While the European practice shows foreign carriers could operate 
within member states’ domestic routes; ASEAN’s policy implies that foreign 
carriers can only enter the domestic markets of the other ASEAN member states 
by creating a joint venture carrier which is subject of certain local ownership 
rules (Hanaoka et al., 2014, p. 96).
Varying degree of interests among the member states has also contributed to 
the distinctive ASEAN context of open skies. ASEAN consists of countries with 
huge domestic markets for air transport, such as Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philippines and Vietnam; while the other country such as Singapore relies heavily 
on international routes (Azalia, 2017, p. 136). Lee (2015) describes member 
countries such as Brunei, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam as strong 
supporters of the open skies. Laos, Cambodia and the Philippines stand as partial 
supporters, while Indonesia has rejected to ratify due to protectionist attitude. As 
a result, the varying degree of interests towards the open skies potentially slow the 
full implementation of ASAM in the region.
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Table 1. Air Freedom Rights in ASEAN Open Skies Policy
Country A Country B Return
Third freedom Jakarta, Indonesia Bangkok, Thailand
Fourth freedom Jakarta, Indonesia Bangkok, Thailand Yes
Fifth freedom Jakarta, Indonesia Bangkok, Thailand Yes, with a stopover in 
Singapore (country C), 
for profit or discharge
Source: Jin Tan (2014).
Note: With Garuda Indonesia flight from Jakarta to Bangkok as a modelling.
Indonesia has signed AMALPAS (ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Full 
Liberalisation of Passenger Air Services) on 12 November 2010. However, 
Indonesia ratified the agreement 7 years later in 2016. The presidential decree 
number 12 Year 2016 ratifies the agreement to take effect in Indonesia specifically 
for the protocol 1 (unlimited third and fourth freedom of air traffic rights within 
ASEAN Member States) and for the protocol 2 which authorises fifth freedom. 
According to decision of Directorate General of Air Transport, Ministry of 
Transportation No. 480/2012, Indonesian government stated that it has a roadmap 
that is different from ASEAN. This decision was declared to prepare the airlines 
and airports to improve. Moreover, Indonesia would likely to comply the 
liberalisation plan gradually. It is evident that Indonesian government has step by 
step allowed foreign carriers to fully operate in Indonesia since 2005 when the 
government restricted LCCs’ operations in four major cities, such as the capital 
Jakarta, Surabaya, Bali and Medan (Saraswati & Hanaoka, 2013).
Framing Business Preferences and Indonesian 
Commitment Towards Integration
Garuda Indonesia
GA, the national airline of Indonesia, did not perceive ASEAN Open Skies as an 
opportunity to reap profits. Their basic interest as a business to profit from this 
agreement is doubtful since Garuda believes that the low-cost carrier business 
model has a far better opportunity to thrive. Garuda has to fly from a point at 
Indonesian territory to other countries, but this case is different when it is 
compared to the LCCs from Singapore and Malaysia. These carriers could pick up 
the passengers from an Indonesian airport, transport them at their airports and fly 
them to their final destination within or beyond the ASEAN region. Garuda also 
has concerns about Indonesia’s geographical position, which is situated in the 
southern part of Southeast Asia. Indonesia’s position did not allow Indonesian 
airlines to become a hub in the region, which resulted in the low possibility of 
making the traffic freedoms beneficial.
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Table 2. Garuda Indonesia Market Share for Passengers Flying from Indonesia, January–
December 2017
Routes Market Share (%) Rank
Indonesia–Asia 17.61 2
Indonesia–Australia 20.27 2




Source: IATA DDS. Presented by Garuda Indonesia in a focus group discussion with the respective 
ministries. Yogyakarta, 9 August 2018. The data were further processed by the author.
Garuda denied competition as the main concern of the ASEAN Open Skies 
implementation. The manager we interviewed has asserted that given the service 
quality of Garuda as the only Indonesian 5-star airline (according to Skytrax) and 
their fleet rejuvenation (4.5 years on average), the airline is ready to compete 
internationally. He has also expressed a concern about the agreement that led to an 
unequal playing field with the foreign players.
It is not that we were not ready, but what is the aim of the agreement (Open Skies)? As 
a 5-star airline we are ready to compete, but the competition (through the open skies) 
can be unnecessary. Some terms are not ready (to accommodate us) and we have 
conveyed our aspirations to the government. Sometimes they assumed that we were 
aiming for more government support, but that was not the case. As you may have heard 
from the government presentation, they emphasized mutual reciprocity and equal 
opportunity for traffic rights agreement. For us, the equal level of playing field should 
also be a concern.
Such concern is deemed reasonable from Garuda’s perspective. From Table 2 
it can be inferred that foreign carriers have benefited more than Garuda has from 
the traffic rights agreement. GA has significant market shares for Asia, Australia 
and Middle Eastern routes, yet the airline lost its dominance for further regions, 
such as Europe, Africa and the USA.
When we apply the theory of Woll (2005), the OSP did not encourage Garuda 
to expand their market across the border, as well as to support them in reaching 
more economies of scale. Therefore, Garuda inspires the government to review 
the OSP as a policy choice.
We wish there was another policy review, there must be somebody who is bold enough 
to convey it. Can we learn from the Swiss-Singapore open skies that did not benefit the 
Swiss? The Swiss has reviewed it. Therefore, we should understand the risk of opening 
up the traffic rights, and to what extent our country should have its own policy.2
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Indonesia AirAsia
Indonesia AirAsia mainly serves international routes with roughly 72 per cent of 
its route structure.3 Different from GA (Indonesian Flag Carrier), Indonesia 
AirAsia declared itself as the airline of ASEAN, which operates in a group 
together with the AirAsia Group at their headquarters in Malaysia. This identity 
constructs a different viewpoint when it deals with the ASEAN Open Skies. 
Indonesia AirAsia fully supports the Open Skies. The airline has also requested a 
further development of an Open Skies agreement in the region. Indonesia 
AirAsia’s basic interest is not only profit but also how to connect the routes to its 
regional hub in Kuala Lumpur and beyond in ASEAN countries.
As a regional airline and a part of AirAsia group in ASEAN, we have seen the benefits 
of open skies since the agreement inception in 2012. In 2012, we have developed 3 
AOCs (Airline Operator Certificate) in Southeast Asia such as in Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Thailand and have planned a synergy between the three AOCs. For us, this was an 
opportunity even though we assumed this might not be the case for Indonesian based 
airline companies.
Indonesia AirAsia is aware that its interests may oppose that of the local 
airlines. For instance, Indonesian airlines believed that opening up through the 
Open Skies would possibly share their established market to foreign players, 
because after open skies implementation, inbound flight capacity would 
outnumber the outbound flights from Indonesia. This case particularly occurs in 
high-demand destinations, such as for Bali and Jakarta. As a result, local airlines 
perceived Open Skies as a threat rather than an opportunity. Indonesia AirAsia, in 
this case, is perceived in a subjective interest as a part of AirAsia group that works 
together to link the routes within ASEAN.4
Despite its policy support towards the Open Skies, Indonesia AirAsia has 
expressed that it did not significantly benefit from this agreement. The airline 
stated that implementing a fifth-freedom flight route within ASEAN would not be 
efficient, while all of its aircraft could fly within the border of ASEAN member 
states without a stopover.
ASEAN Open Skies did not help that much for our route expansion in Southeast Asia. 
We can fly for 4 hours directly, point to point within ASEAN borders because we use 
Airbus A320 maximum range to operate. Therefore, there is no point of making a stop-
over. It would just create a ‘W’ route pattern. Can you imagine flying from Singapore, 
having a stop in Bangkok and getting back to Jakarta? We would likely to support an 
open skies agreement beyond ASEAN.5
In view of what has been mentioned by Indonesia AirAsia, the policy preference 
of Indonesia AirAsia is to encourage the agreement formulation that enables them 
to operate beyond ASEAN. In a concrete policy, however, Indonesia AirAsia did 
not seek protection to operate beyond borders. As a business that is connected with 
Permana et al.  55
other subsidiaries, Indonesia AirAsia demands a policy environment that enables 
them to synchronise to its main hub. In addition, Indonesia AirAsia has expressed 
a concern on the airport slots. Without adequate airport slots in the busiest airports 
throughout Indonesia, flight freedoms will not be useful in the future.
Sriwijaya Air
Established in 2003, SJ serves mainly domestic routes with gradual expansions to 
regional routes in Southeast and East Asia. SJ, starting in 2014, is a newcomer for 
an airline that serves international routes in Indonesia. They started serving point-
to-point routes, such as Indonesia to China, Indonesia to Malaysia and Indonesia 
to Timor Leste, but they have yet to operate a flight with fifth freedom in ASEAN 
or beyond. As per 2018, the operational aspects of the airlines are being handled 
by the Garuda Indonesia Group, thus opening up the possibility for acquisition.
With regard to the ASEAN Open Skies, a SJ director mentioned that the 
company has supported the agreement as long as it did not open up the opportunity 
for cabotage (foreign carrier flying domestic routes) in Indonesia. Thus, the 
preference of SJ is being shaped by the interest to protect the domestic routes 
while the OSP has allowed only for further rights in certain international routes.
Many airlines were operating in Indonesia in 2012. When the OSP was being proposed, 
we (the private airlines) wanted more openness because our country cannot be protected 
geographically. Thus we need to redefine our sovereignty because despite the open 
skies, we don’t implement the cabotage. We have to be ready, there is no need for 
protection except for the domestic routes.6
There is a consensus between SJ and AirAsia when it comes to benefiting from 
the OSP. Both carriers perceive broader fifth freedoms as necessary, due to the 
geographical conditions of Indonesia for serving further international routes 
beyond ASEAN.
We are the one (the country, Indonesia) that actually needs the fifth freedom due to our 
geographical location. If we ever aim to fly to Europe or further, we need to stop 
somewhere, let’s say Kuala Lumpur.7
Despite the support for OSP, SJ has aimed for more strategic routes to be 
opened, such as those within the sub-regional growth area BIMP-EAGA (Brunei–
Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area) and IMT-GT 
(Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle). The airline has further 
mentioned that the slots are limited even though flying the routes is possible with 
ASEAN’s freedom rights. This also applies to the flights between the capital cities 
that are deemed more beneficial. SJ perceives such routes are more profitable, but 
the company was fully aware of the fact that the routes are highly competitive. 
According to the director, some ASEAN member states allowed foreign carriers 
to operate within the routes on a limited basis.
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State Responses and Indonesian Commitment to the 
ASEAN Open Skies Policy
Explaining the State Interests
In order to assess the state’s interest in the ASEAN Open Skies, the public choice 
approach was used. We also analysed the perceived economic benefits and 
whether or not the economic gains can possibly be equally distributed among the 
ASEAN member states, thus propelling commitment forward. Interestingly 
enough, there was no clear indication of vested or personal interest involved at the 
ministerial level. This is because the Indonesian position for the international 
agreements on the Open Skies is tied to several principles that took the domestic 
interests into full consideration.
In principles, the formulation of the OSP in Indonesia was selectively decided 
and considered the national interest, the national airline’s capability and it must 
hold a non-cabotage principle that allows for only domestic airlines to fly the 
domestic routes. The agreement should also consider traffic value on the negotiated 
routes, which includes the traffic rights for the cargo. Opening up the inbound 
international routes to Indonesia must be decided upon the basis of certain 
considerations, such as the commercial aspects and economy, the social and 
cultural aspects, defence, as well as their connection with the domestic routes, 
while every international agreement is subject to domestic regulations. In short, 
the agreement should encourage the domestic airlines to collaborate with partners 
from overseas (Air Transport Directorate, 2017). Indonesia is also known to 
control its aviation market. Government regulates prices, facilities and services at 
Indonesian airports, while in terms of investment, the government limits foreign 
investment at 49 per cent. The restrictions have also included air transport services 
sub-sectors such as reservation system, passenger and cargo handling and leasing 
(Anas & Panjaitan, 2018).
In regard to the perceived economic benefits, the ministry has benefited from 
several opportunities by implementing the ASEAN Open Skies. This should serve 
as an incentive for the state to pursue further commitment towards the OSP. As 
stated in the ministry’s presentation, the OSP could open up a route network, gain 
more access to foreign markets (within the ASEAN member states) and increase 
air traffic to the country, thus boosting the tourism sector. Despite these many 
opportunities, the ministry has expressed some concerns regarding the OSP. They 
stated that Indonesian airlines are still prioritising the domestic market, due to the 
limited international and regional network as well as other constraints to fully 
maximise the traffic rights, such as the difficulties of market expansion. According 
to the Air Transport Directorate (2017), there are some domestic and regional 
constraints that benefit from the OSP. ASEAN member states have yet to fully 
harmonise operating permits while the airports that are being liberalised for the 
OSP are often overcrowded. For instance, airports no longer have slots for the 
favourable departure times. It is also problematic that the airports in ASEAN 
member states have different capacities.
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Due to both domestic and regional constraints, Indonesia took a gradual step in 
implementing the OSP to uphold its principles and to look carefully at a concern 
over business competition. Indonesia holds on a commitment to the principles of 
reciprocity and equal opportunity among the ASEAN member states. It is 
important to ensure that the benefit of OSP would also be equally distributed 
among the big and small ASEAN member states, namely the states with a greater 
number of airports (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand), and the states with 
limited airports (Singapore and Brunei Darussalam). Moreover, our interview has 
indicated that the strategy was also due to a concern over competition among the 
domestic and the international airlines.
In general, we support the OSP by opening up 5 airports... We have limited the airports 
(that are opened) to 5 airports. That is also for a preventive move, considering the 
possibility of tight business competition (between domestic and international airlines), 
but we saw that other countries have opened their airports as well.8
State-business Policy Dialogue on Open Skies
In this part of the analysis, we resolve the interest intermediation aspect between 
the airlines as business actors and the government that represents the state of 
Indonesia. Some argue that there was no conflicting interest between the 
businesses and the government regarding positioning Indonesia’s national interest 
in the OSP, while others perceived that regional commitment towards the open 
skies was a top-down decision from top officials without carefully taking domestic 
aviation market situations into account. In addition, all business actors agreed that 
there are direct channels to convey their interests to the government.
The interviewee from the national carrier, GA, concerned that the government 
and his company have a different roadmap than the others. This is due to a 
mismatch between the head of state’s move for a commitment at the regional level 
and the business interest to sustain its market strategy. As a state-owned company, 
GA is obligated to comply with the government roadmap, which often contrasting 
the market situation.9
According to a government official from the Ministry of Transportation, 
interest intermediation has been facilitated through regular internal meetings. 
Oftentimes, the ministry had requested feedback from the airlines before 
formulating a new Open Skies agreement. This policy feedback process was 
confirmed by the commercial director of SJ.10 Similarly, AirAsia’s commercial 
director mentioned that direct contact with the government is straightforward. It 
can be taking place through phone or personal contacts or at any particular 
meetings. He has also said that the company has regularly consulted with the 
Ministry of Tourism to attract more inbound tourists to Indonesia.11
Nevertheless, our findings did not fully provide a strong evidence to the 
fact that interests of business can be conveyed at the elite level, for instance 
between the CEOs and high-ranking officials at the ministry or presidential 
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office. Beech and Suhartono (2018) in The New York Times has indicated that 
the CEO of Lion Air holds a high position within the political party that 
supports the current Joko Widodo administration.
From Business Preferences, State Interests to Commitment to Economic 
Integration: How Did the Commitment Being Constrained?
As we return to the analytical framework, commitment to economic integration is 
determined by businesses’ policy choice. The independent variable is further 
intervened by state preferences in dealing with the regional ASEAN context to 
implement the ASEAN OSP. Our findings suggest that mixed reactions took place 
among Indonesian airlines due to many factors such as their market share, business 
strategy (whether focussing on domestic or international routes) as well as the link 
to international airlines grouping. Concerns over a more equal level of the playing 
field between the domestic and international players occur, while others are 
questioning the real benefit of implementing the agreement.
It is also apparent from the state interests that Indonesia is still holding on the 
principles of prioritising its national interest over regional commitment. Strong 
evidence was found when Indonesia limits foreign equity in air transport, rejects 
cabotage and suggests that the implementation of open skies must consider 
various domestic aspects ranging from commercial to defence aspects, as well as 
the linkage to domestic airlines, while the open skies implementation is subject to 
domestic regulations.
However, when dealing with regional bargaining one has indicated that the 
commitment was made at the elite level that to some extent neglecting the real 
market situation. This rather contradictory given Indonesia’s policy choice to 
gradually open its airports as a preventive move for a possible tight competition 
among the airlines. At the regional level, Indonesia promotes the principles of 
equal opportunity and reciprocity considering differences of access among 
ASEAN member states.
As a result, there are several possible explanations for the commitment 
constraints. First, the domestic aspects. Indonesia has carefully taking a gradual 
step due to its airlines’ mixed aspirations and national interest. Second, the 
ASEAN regional context that makes a negotiated move possible, has allowed 
Indonesia to exert more bargaining based on its domestic considerations, as well 
as the principles the equal opportunity and reciprocity.
Conclusion
This study set out to discuss two questions on the interplay of the ways business 
preferences may constrain a commitment to economic integration, and the state 
response to the business preferences. We have argued that commitment towards 
economic integration is contested domestically and this has resulted in the 
postponement of ASEAN OSP implementation in Indonesia. Business preferences 
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cannot be taken as a single aspiration due to the different types of business 
identity and strategy, while their perceived economic benefits from open skies 
also shaped their preferences towards the open skies. Our study suggests there 
has been little agreement on how the OSP could benefit the domestic airlines. It 
is apparent that one of them was demanding an equal level of playing field to 
compete and the others were questioning the benefit of open skies due to their 
particular business strategy.
In response to the mixed preferences of the businesses, the state actors have to 
comply the principles that adhere national interests and constraint tight 
competition that possibly makes the domestic airlines losing out their markets. 
Therefore, the state has partially liberalised its market by granting a certain 
period of adjustment through postponement, while ensuring the reciprocity and 
the equal opportunity principles can be accommodated at the regional level. With 
a regional architecture that allows a negotiated move, ASEAN regional context 
has constrained a full implementation of a single aviation market in Southeast 
Asia within its given deadlines.
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Notes
1. ASEAN OSP to be implemented in 2015. See https://www.aseanbriefing.com/
news/2015/01/02/asean-open-skies-policy-implemented-2015.html
2. From an interview with the Senior Manager Alliances and International Affairs, 
Garuda Indonesia in Yogyakarta, 9 August 2018.
3. Data from Indonesia AirAsia’s presentation in an FGD with respective ministries in 
Yogyakarta, 9 August 2018.
4. From an interview with the Director of Commercial, Indonesia AirAsia in Jakarta, 15 
August 2018.
5. From an interview with the Director of Commercial, Indonesia AirAsia in Jakarta, 15 
August 2018.
6. From an interview with Director of Commercial, Sriwijaya Air Group in Jakarta, 21 
August 2018.
7. From an interview with Director of Commercial, Sriwijaya Air Group in Jakarta, 21 
August 2018.
8. From an interview with The Head of Air Transport Cooperation, Ministry of 
Transportation, Republic of Indonesia, 1 August 2018 in Jakarta.
9. From an interview with the Senior Manager of Alliances and International Affairs, 
Garuda Indonesia in Yogyakarta, 9 August 2018.
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10 From an interview with the Director of Commercial, Sriwijaya Air Group in Jakarta, 
21 August 2018.
11 From an interview with the Director of Commercial, Indonesia AirAsia in Jakarta, 15 
August 2018.
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